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ABSTRACT
Web content delivery is one of the most important services
on the Internet. Access to websites is typically secured via
TLS. However, this security model does not account for pre-
fix hijacking on the network layer, which may lead to traffic
blackholing or transparent interception. Thus, to achieve
comprehensive security and service availability, additional
protective mechanisms are necessary such as the RPKI, a
recently deployed Resource Public Key Infrastructure to pre-
vent hijacking of traffic by networks. This paper argues two
positions. First, that modern web hosting practices make
route protection challenging due to the propensity to spread
servers across many different networks, often with unpre-
dictable client redirection strategies; and, second, that we
need a better understanding why protection mechanisms are
not deployed. To initiate this, we empirically explore the
relationship between web hosting infrastructure and RPKI
deployment. Perversely, we find that less popular websites
are more likely to be secured than the prominent sites. Worry-
ingly, we find many large-scale CDNs do not support RPKI,
thus making their customers vulnerable. This leads us to
explore business reasons why operators are hesitant to deploy
RPKI, which may help to guide future research on improving
Internet security.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Pro-
tocols—Routing Protocols; C.2.5 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Local and Wide-Area Networks—Internet
General Terms
Security, Measurement
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1. INTRODUCTION
Website security is a long pursued and rather esoteric goal.
Traditionally, it has been approached from an end-to-end
perspective (e.g. TLS), largely because this is easily within the
sphere of control of any web provider. However, as evidenced
by many prominent attacks, this is frequently insufficient.
This is because various third party infrastructure dependencies
exist that maybe vulnerable to attack, e.g. within BGP, DNS,
certificate authorities, operating systems.
Take, for example, BGP, which manages inter-domain con-
nectivity. If BGP is misconfigured, websites can become
severed from the network, regardless of the security measures
taken at the application layer [4,27,33]. Thus, true security re-
quires multi-layer and multi-stakeholder cooperation. In this
paper, we focus on the importance of routing layer security
for ensuring reliable website provision.
Routing security is a topic that is discussed widely among
network operators, yet (anecdotally) receives far less attention
from web service providers. This is despite the availability of
technologies that mitigate attacks. For example, the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a recently standardized
framework that enables BGP routers to perform prefix origin
validation. When activated, this can prevent incidents such as
the Pakistan Telecom hijacking of traffic destined to YouTube.
It works by crytographically validating the right of an AS to
advertise a prefix. Although clearly attractive as a security
measure, it is unclear to what extent networks and content
providers have engaged with RPKI. The complexity of this
question is particularly exacerbated by the unusual way web-
sites are often hosted. Generally, they rely on third party
networks to host their servers with many services spreading
their content among multiple networks and CDNs. Enabling
RPKI is therefore not just a matter of flipping a switch. Al-
though this could dissuade websites from utilising RPKI, it
does not reduce its importance.
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In this paper, we argue that websites should take a holistic
approach to securing their services by extending security
provisions beyond traditional end-to-end concerns. Although
there are many third party dependencies that websites should
secure, we focus on BGP due to the recency of several attacks
in this realm. We conduct the first quantitative analysis of
the deployment of RPKI by web providers. We make several
worrying discoveries, revealing a lack of awareness of the
importance of securing BGP among those hosting websites.
Perversely, this ranges from huge international players such
as Google to small regional websites. We then explore the
reasons for this, as well as intuitive steps that should be taken.
Our findings can be summarized as follows:
1. Less popular websites are commonly better secured than
websites with many visitors.
2. CDNs tend to ignore RPKI, whereas ISPs and webhosters
have started RPKI deployment.
3. CDN servers that are placed in third party networks bene-
fit from RPKI deployment that these networks perform.
4. CDN deployment policies are the principle cause for a
reduced security level at prominent websites.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. § 2
details the problem space. § 3 introduces a first proposal of
a broadly reproducible measurement methodology and § 4
presents our first findings. § 5 sheds light on business reasons
why operators do not deploy RPKI and sketches a research
agenda. § 6 briefly surveys related work. § 7 concludes with
our outlook.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Primer on RPKI
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [23] governs the inter-
domain routing of the Internet. BGP exchanges announce-
ments that advertise the ability to reach IP prefixes between
Autonomous Systems (ASes). An AS represents a set of pre-
fixes that it originates and is identified by unique AS Number
(ASN). Unfortunately, a BGP speaker may announce any IP
prefix, allowing a malicious or misconfigured party to disrupt
routing. To undermine access to a website, a malicious BGP
speaker could, for example, advertise the website’s IP prefix
and “steal” traffic destined to it.
To address the above problem, the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [18] has been designed. It is a PKI
framework dedicated to securing the Internet routing infras-
tructure. It uses cryptographic certificates to prove the owner-
ship of Internet number resources (i.e. ASNs and IP prefixes).
However, the Internet decouples the ownership of resources
and their routing. Hence, the RPKI introduces Route Ori-
gin Authorization (ROA) objects. A correctly signed ROA
authorizes an AS to originate one or more prefixes.
Using ROA data, an RPKI-enabled router is able to validate
the BGP updates it receives. There are three states for BGP
updates when validated using the RPKI, valid, invalid, and
not found. Rejecting an invalid route announcement helps to
suppress incorrectly announced prefix, thus preventing route
hijacking of websites for example. Of course, invalid an-
nouncements do not necessarily indicate malicious behaviour,
e.g. it could be misconfiguration of ROAs [32]. However,
from a website operator’s perspective, this is irrelevant.
2.2 RPKI and the Web
To successfully access a webpage, there are usually two key
requisites: (i) retrieve a valid domain→IP address mapping
via DNS; and (ii) establish valid end-to-end routing from the
client to the mapped IP address. DNSSEC [1] can ensure
valid name to address mapping. This paper focuses on the
routing layer.
To secure the routing layer (via RPKI), a website operator
must take certain steps. In the simplest case, a web page is
hosted on a single web server situated in a single AS. The
prefix owner therefore needs to create a single RPKI entry
for the prefix-AS pair, which hosts the domain. However,
highly popular webpages are often distributed among several
web servers to increase availability and performance. With
the advent of Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), these web
servers are not only reachable via different IP prefixes but
also placed in different ASes. To fully secure the web server
infrastructure of the domain, all prefix-AS pairs need to be in-
cluded into the RPKI. It is worth noting that content provided
by CDNs is not necessarily located in the AS of the CDN, in
which case the CDN has no control over the authorization of
this AS.
2.3 Attacker Model: Beyond DoS
Having clarified that the current Web ecosystem compli-
cates the success of countermeasures to correctly access con-
tent on the network layer, we now introduce an attacker model
which lacks sufficient attention in our community. We assume
an attacker who is able to redirect network traffic destined to
the web server by manipulating Internet routing, i.e. sending
malicious route updates related to the web server infrastruc-
ture. Compared to very common DoS attacks against web
servers, this threat might seem less likely. However, even
difficult attacks find their way into the real world, sooner
or later. A simple example we refer to the Great Cannon
attack beginning this year [20], where an ISP injected on-path
malicious JavaScript code into live network traffic to disturb
connectivity to GitHub. Note that TLS does not necessarily
protect against such an attack when prefix hijacking is in
place [9].
There are political as well as commercial reasons that mo-
tivates an attacker to attack a web server. Leveraging prefix
hijacking has several attractive advantages. First, the attacker
can intercept the network traffic, which enables him to drop,
monitor, or modify packets. Second, the attack does not
necessarily need to affect all clients—when malicious route
propagation is restricted locally, the attacker can harm spe-
cific subset of clients. Third, the attack can be performed
without notifying the website under attack. In the follow-
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Figure 1: Comparison of IP deployment for www and
w/o www domain names.
ing, we explore the severity of this threat and the level of
countermeasures currently deployed via RPKI.
3. PRELIMINARY METHODOLOGY
Our measurement study proceeds in four steps: (1) selec-
tion of websites; (2) mapping domain names to IP addresses;
(3) mapping these IP addresses to IP prefixes routed in the
Internet and their origin ASes; and (4) validating if these
ASes support RPKI. The purpose is to explore how widely
deployed RPKI is among web providers. We now describe
our methodology, which is meant to be simple and widely
reproducible. All data will be made available.
(1) Selecting Domain Names. To explore RPKI deploy-
ment among websites, it is necessary to first select a sample
set. To achieve this, we extract the top 1 million websites
from the Alexa list [3]. This is the default approach taken by
most web measurements (e.g. [2, 5, 19, 25]), and allows us to
explore how RPKI deployment varies across popularity ranks.
(2) Mapping Domains to IP Addresses. To map domain
names taken from the Alexa into IP addresses, we utilise
several public resolvers (to improve reproducibility). Using
Google DNS, we collect all A, AAAA, and CNAME records for
all the Alexa domain names, including the names appended
with the prefix www. We refer to the former as a “w/o www
domain”. The measurements were performed from Berlin
repeatedly over several weeks in 2014 and 2015. We also
used Open DNS and us01 of the DNS Looking Glass [8]
to verify that the results returned from Google DNS were
not miscellaneous. We obtain similar results from all three
datasets. We exclude all invalid DNS answers, i.e. all special-
purpose IPv4 and IPv6 addresses reserved by the IANA.
Note that, although the distributed nature of DNS may lead
to answers that vary between locations, we delay exploration
of CDN redirection strategies to future work. This is because
we are primarily interested in checking whole ASes, rather
than where individual clients are redirected to. In Section 4,
we show that our main results remain independent of the DNS
server selection because CDNs are reluctant to create ROAs
at all. Analyzing the effects of many vantage points will be
part of our future work.
To briefly analyze the overlap between www and w/o www
domains, we quantify the amount of equal prefixes per do-
main. Figure 1 shows that for the first 100k domains more
than 76% of the IP prefixes are equal for both names. For the
remaining domains, more than 94% of the names refer to the
same prefix. As a side observation, in future work it should
be explored how this fact can help accelerate continuous DNS
measurements.
(3) Mapping IP Addresses to Prefixes and ASNs. To
map addresses to ASNs, we take dumps of the active ta-
bles of the RIPE RIS route servers. For each IP address of
a domain name, we extract all covering prefixes and derive
the origin AS from the AS path (i.e., the right most ASN in
the AS path). Note that entries with an AS_SET are excluded
from our study as this leads to an ambiguity of the attribute,
which is why the function is deprecated with the deployment
of RPKI [16].
(4) RPKI Validation. For the validation of the BGP data,
we follow the necessary steps to perform origin validation at
BGP routers. ROA data of all trust anchors (APNIC, AfriNIC,
ARIN, LACNIC, and RIPE) are collected and validated. Only
cryptographically correct ROAs are further used to check the
IP prefixes obtained from the BGP table dumps.
The outcome of this process is a comprehensive list of all
Alexa websites that (i) can be resolved from our DNS vantage
point and (ii) mapped to an IP prefix AS pair. This list is (iii)
annotated with RPKI origin validation outcome.
4. RESULTS
We have used the above methodology to collect data on
RPKI deployment for all 1 million Alexa domains. After ex-
cluding 0.07% incorrect DNS answers, we gathered 1,167,086
IP addresses for the www domains and 1,154,170 IP addresses
for the w/o www domains. These addresses map to 1,369,030
and 1,334,957 different prefix-AS pairs respectively. 0.01%
of the IP addresses are not reachable from our BGP van-
tage points.
In the following subsections, we present the core RPKI
validation outcomes, and explore reasons for the observed
deployment state. For better visibility, we do not present
results per domain but apply a binning of 10k domains in
all graphs, after experimenting with different bin sizes. As a
domain name may refer to multiple IP addresses, which may
belong to different IP prefixes and ASes, several RPKI states
may exist per domain. To represent heterogeneous RPKI
deployment, we assign corresponding probabilities to domain
names (e.g. 3/5 or 60% RPKI coverage of foo.bar).
4.1 Less Popular Content is More Secured
We first explore how many websites are secured via RPKI,
shown in Figure 2. On average, only 6% of the web server
prefixes are covered by RPKI (either correctly or incorrectly
announced in the BGP). This is somewhat worrying consider-
ing the international prominence of the websites under study.
However, it also effectively illustrates that web operation
and network operation are decoupled. Roughly 0.09% of the
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Figure 2: RPKI validation outcome for the 1 million
Alexa domains (valid = the origin AS is allowed to an-
nounce the prefix, invalid = the origin AS is not allowed
to announce the prefix, and not found = the announced
prefix is not covered by the RPKI).
prefixes are invalid according to the RPKI prefix origin vali-
dation, spread evenly across all Alexa ranks. This observation
is in qualitative agreement with the general RPKI deploy-
ment. Note that the current invalid BGP announcements do
not necessarily indicate hijacking, but rather potential miscon-
figuration [32]. The amount of invalids is evenly distributed
among all web domains.
Perhaps more interesting is the distribution of RPKI sup-
port across the different popularity rankings. By inspecting
Figure 2, distinct trends can be seen. Perversely, domains
with a high rank (i.e. popular sites in the top 100k) are less
likely to be secured than less popular sites. Among the first
100k domains (e.g. google.com, blogspot.com), only
≈4.0% of web server prefixes are secured via RPKI. In con-
trast, for the last 100k domains, ≈5.5% are secured. The
absolute numbers are small, but a clear trend is visible and
may reflect the deployment strategy of different stakeholders.
Table 1 shows the first top 10 domains that have RPKI
support, i.e. either all or at least one prefix which is associated
with the domain name is part of the RPKI. It is clearly visible
that (i) almost all of the very popular sites are unsecured; and
(ii) sometimes there is differing RPKI support for a website’s
www and w/o www domains; and (iii) most of the content is
only partially secured. We now analyze the deployment by
CDNs in more detail.
4.2 CDN Content Benefits from 3rd Party ISPs
CDNs are a critical part of modern web delivery. Many
websites rely on them to deliver their content. Next, we focus
on the RPKI deployment of CDNs. To study this, we search
the RPKI repository for attestation objects that belong to
the ASes of well-known CDNs. Specifically, we inspect the
infrastructures of Akamai, Amazon, Cdnetworks, Chinacache,
RPKI Coverage
Alexa Rank & Domain Name www w/o www
2 facebook.com 3 (3/3) 3 (2/2)
70 cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net n/a Ú (1/3)
73 huffingtonpost.com Ú (1/3) 8 (0/3)
92 cnet.com Ú (1/3) 8 (0/2)
95 dailymail.co.uk Ú (1/3) 8 (0/1)
117 indiatimes.com Ú (1/3) 8 (0/1)
120 kickass.to Ú (1/10) Ú (1/10)
130 booking.com 3 (4/4) 3 (2/2)
Table 1: Top 10 Alexa domains that have partial (Ú) or
full (3) RPKI coverage, including number of prefixes.
Chinanet, Cloudflare, Cotendo, Edgecast, Highwinds, Instart,
Internap, Limelight, Mirrorimage, Netdna, Simplecdn, and
Yottaa. It is worth noting that the results of this approach do
not depend on DNS measurements and thus do not include a
bias that might result from any DNS measurement point.
To derive the AS numbers of these CDNs, we apply key-
word spotting on common AS assignment lists. This leads to
a lower bound for the current state of deployment. We dis-
cover 199 ASes operated by these CDNs. From these, we find
only four entries in the RPKI. These four prefixes are owned
by Internap and are tied to three origin ASes. One might
mistakenly think that Internap has therefore engaged widely
with RPKI. However, Internap operates at least 41 ASes, the
bulk of which are not secured via RPKI. No other CDN has
made any deployment. Thus, these CDNs do not actively
participate in the creation of RPKI attestation objects. This
is in contrast to web hosters or common ISPs that, as shown
previously, have far higher levels of penetration (> 5%).
Another interesting trend has been for CDNs to place
caches in third party networks (e.g. eyeball ISPs). This al-
lows the CDN to “inherit” RPKI support from the third party
network. Based on our previous observation, i.e. these CDNs
do not create ROAs, we know that every RPKI-enabled CDN-
content is served by a third party network.
4.3 Are the CDNs to blame?
To quantify the impact that CDNs have on global website
support for RPKI, we conduct a basic classification of CDN
domains. Generally, CDNs use CNAME chains (Canonical
Names) to redirect DNS requests to their caches. We ex-
ploit this fact to identify how many of our Alexa domains
use CDNs. We say a domain is served by a CDN, if the IP
address of its domain name is indirectly accessed via two
or more CNAMEs (e.g. www.huffingtonpost.com→
www.huffingtonpost.com.\edgesuite.net→ a495.
g.akamai.net → 212.201.100.136). We confirm
this rough heuristic by comparing its results with an indepen-
dent classification provided by HTTPArchive. HTTPArchive
classifies the first 300k Alexa domains based on DNS pat-
tern matching of CNAMEs, which is distinct from our test of
DNS indirections. Furthermore, the HTTPArchive monitor-
ing agent is located in Redwood City, CA, USA, and thus a
geographically separated vantage point.
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Figure 3: Popularity of CDNs—comparison of CDN de-
tection heuristics for 1M Alexa domains.
Figure 3 compares the distributions of CDN-hosted web
domains as determined by our classification approach and
HTTPArchive (in 10k bins). The two almost identically
shaped curves clearly indicate that popular websites are more
likely to be served by CDNs. Quantitatively, our approach
indicates fewer CDNs than HTTPArchive. This is not sur-
prising, since there are CDN deployments without CNAME
chains. However, a conservative (under)-estimate of CDN
domains sharpens our view on the RPKI-protection of CDN
domains: (Over-)enlarging the set of CDN domains will mix
deployment cases and diffuse the overall picture.
Integrating the above results, we now explore why highly
ranked websites do not support RPKI. Specifically, we fo-
cus on the relation between RPKI-enabled and CDN-served
websites. Figure 4 depicts the distribution of RPKI-enabled
websites across the Alexa rankings. The figure separates web-
sites into those that utilise a CDN and those that do not. In
contrast to the Alexa domains at large, RPKI deployment is
fairly independent of the rank for CDNs. Results fluctuate
around an average of≈ 0.9%. This is almost an order of mag-
nitude lower than the overall RPKI deployment rate, which is
plotted for comparison.
Combining the lines of argument, we have shown that
(i) CDN deployment is strongly enhanced for popular do-
mains, but (ii) RPKI deployment for CDNs is low—independent
of content popularity. As a result, a high density of CDN sites
reduces the RPKI-enabled portion of domains. This holds for
those ranks of the Alexa list where CDNs are more common:
at the top ranks. In summary, the observable degradation of
routing security for popular websites is caused by the resis-
tance of CDN operators to adopt RPKI in their ASes.
5. DISCUSSION AND RESEARCH AGENDA
After (i) identifying a new attacker model, which has sub-
stantial potential to threaten the Web, and (ii) analysing the
current deployment of the state-of-the-art countermeasure,
we are left with a surprisingly basic but still unanswered ques-
tion: How can a content owner easily verify that his content is
reliably and securely delivered in the current Web ecosystem?
5.1 Securing Web Architectures
First and foremost, we call for a more elegant and approach-
able web architecture. We currently see a complex ecosystem
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Figure 4: RPKI deployment statistics on CDNs and for
the unconditioned Web.
built by a broad set of (sometimes competing) stakeholders.
These include many network operators, content providers,
and CDNs, largely underpinned by an abused DNS infrastruc-
ture. At each stage in the content delivery chain, different
security protocols are being employed, making a comprehen-
sive understanding virtually impossible for most web startups.
For instance, a key finding of our work is the poor awareness
that web providers have regarding routing security. Despite
its importance, only a small fraction of websites have any
deployment of RPKI.
The above observations are unlikely to change in the near
future as the deployment of such mechanisms require notable
effort. As of yet, we have not witnessed events critical enough
to shake most web providers into action. However, we should
not be sitting and waiting for a major event to disrupt the
Internet content delivery ecosystem, as we have already many
examples hinting at its potential impact [4, 27, 30]. A key
part of our future research agenda is expanding our work
from RPKI to include other security mechanisms that web
providers should be aware of (e.g. DNSSEC). Ultimately,
we argue that new systems should be devised that increase
transparency and thus make the comprehensive understanding
and deployment of e2e security much more straightforward.
5.2 Incentivizing RPKI Deployment
Returning to our key contribution, we also argue that the
need for RPKI must be more critically communicated to
web providers—particularly large CDNs that serve dispropor-
tionate amounts of web traffic. This is largely a process of
minimising barriers (e.g. cost), alongside offering incentives.
During our study, we have spoken to many network operators
to gauge their opinion of RPKI. We have found several rea-
sons why operators have not deployed it (e.g. [10]). Often
this relates to a lack of perceived need, combined with insuf-
ficient manpower and expertise in the area. This is common
across many technologies. More interestingly, we also have
discovered RPKI-specific factors that dissuade adoption.
RPKI is a proactive security solution that implements a pos-
itive attestation model. As such, RPKI exposes information
that organisations may be wary of revealing. Most worrying
to some is the potential of revealing their business relations.
In RPKI, prefix owners must proactively create ROAs before
any attack occurs. As soon as at least one ROA for an IP
prefix exists, all valid origin ASes for this IP prefix need to
be assigned in the RPKI before route updates are processed
(otherwise a BGP update including the prefix and missing
ASes becomes invalid). Although a prefix owner can assign
any AS without asking for approval, it is very likely that the
ROA information indicates a business relation between pre-
fix owner and authorized origin AS. This might be a serious
concern, from our discussions with several operators.
To illustrate a business policy conflict, imagine that two
large CDNs serve secretly as backups for each other. As
changes within the DNS are slow, they could quickly redi-
rect traffic using BGP. Similarly, smaller CDNs that rely on
third party networks (e.g. using Verisign for external DoS
mitigation) may see such information as damaging to their
reputation. Despite this, in both cases, RPKI would publicly
reveal these setups.
It is worth noting that RPKI data differs from public routing
data such as BGP collectors or looking glasses. Those sources
also provide insights into peering relations but only after the
event has occurred. Furthermore, the data analysis follows
an exploratory approach because not all vantage points report
the same. In contrast to this, the RPKI represents a catalog
which does not only allow for easy browsing but also doc-
uments information in advance. In case of a very unlikely
or never occurring event (e.g., a backup incident), the RPKI
exposes more information. We therefore argue for changes to
RPKI that address these business concerns. Whereas privacy-
aware protocols are rife in other fields (e.g. Tor), they have
always been seen as less important in the routing layer. The
above observations undermine this assumption. Arguably, not
recognising this issue could be extremely damaging to RPKI
deployment.
5.3 Web Measurement Methodology
A tangential observation from our work is the daunting
complexity of launching web measurement campaigns. Com-
piling a generalised and comprehensive methodology for deal-
ing with this still eludes the web community. Questions that
remain open include: (i) which websites should be queried;
(ii) where should they be queried from; (iii) how these should
be distributed over time. For instance, selecting Alexa web-
sites is a typical approach, however, results differ for www
and w/o www domains; complexity is also greatly increased
when considered the tendency to shard content across multi-
ple subdomains in a website. Some might say that security
incidents in the past [4, 27, 33] have showed that routing
failures usually affect complete web pages instead of just
subdomains. However, a commercially motivated attacker
may explicitly target subdomains, e.g. those hosting adverts.
Exhaustive crawls may be suitable for small sets of websites,
but scalability quickly becomes a challenge particularly when
duplicating crawls across regions. Answering these questions
at scale is not trivial, and should be explored further. We
plan to use such insights to expand our methodology in a
generalised way that can help others to perform web mea-
surements too. Without better methodologies in this field,
web measurements may become increasingly infeasible and
unreproducible as web complexity increases.
6. RELATED WORK
The deployment of RPKI started in 2011. Several looking
glasses and tools exist [15, 17, 21, 24, 29, 31] to inspect the
current state of deployment or to do experiments, but up
until now only few publications studied the current state of
deployment in detail. [14, 32] analyze the RPKI validation
outcome of entire BGP tables trying to better understand
invalid BGP announcements. [7] discusses the risk when
RPKI authorities misbehave, and [12] explores the general
limitations of current secure inter-domain routing protocols.
Nevertheless, large ISPs such as Deutsche Telekom and ATT
added their IP prefixes to the RPKI, which motivates the
relevance of this new protocol framework. The motivation
to adapt new Internet protocols is analyzed in [22], with a
special focus on secure inter-domain routing in [6, 11]. Our
work complements these insights by clarifying that CDNs
can benefit from early RPKI-adoption in third party networks
where their servers are hosted.
Several measurement studies discovered the content dis-
tribution space (e.g. [2, 13, 26, 28]). We emphasize that the
aim of this paper is not to reveal the hosting infrastructure
completely but to present a trend analyse of RPKI adoption in
the wild and its interplay with the web ecosystem by applying
a very basic methodology.
7. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we analyzed the RPKI-protection of web-
sites. We resolved 1M domain names from the Alexa ranking,
mapped the IP addresses to IP prefixes and origin ASes visible
in the global BGP routing table, and validate each prefix-AS
pair against the currently deployed RPKI data.
We found that RPKI security deployment is significantly
degraded for the more popular websites, which led us to apply
a new, initial methodology for discovering its reasons. Our
findings revealed that CDN hosters are the likely cause for this
operational bias. Their enhanced provenience at prominent
web domains on the one hand, and their obvious reluctance
towards RPKI deployment on the other hand strongly indicate
that prominent websites would be better protected against
routing attacks without CDNs.
In future work, we will aim to explore in more detail why
CDNs implement this operational behavior. Furthermore, we
will compare RPKI deployment with the adoption of other
core protocols such as DNSSEC.
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